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 126 NEW BOOKS. ideas, gestures, and indeed any mental processes. The question there- fore arises : Can we discover any experiences which constantly accom- pany processes that " become judgments" and lend them their character as judgments ? Dr. Marbe used as subjects two skilful observers (Prof. Kiilpe and Prof. Boetteken), induced in them a large number of judg- ment-processes, and registered the results that they obtained by intro- spection. He comes to the conclusion that there are no constant concomitants or, as he rather rashly puts it, "no psychological con- ditions " of judgment. But was it to be expected that the characteristic of judgment should lie in something extrinsic to it ? The author appar- ently started by supposing that this might be the case because any experience can "become a judgment". But supposing this to be true, what does it imply? Later on, Dr. Marbe says that any experience becomes a judgment when the subject intends it to " agree with other objects ". This is scarcely satisfactory, since he does not explain what is meant by " agreement," but in any case we have got beyond the initial idea or whatever it may be, for (1) we have a fresh attitude on the part of the subject, and (2) the " other objects " must also somehow enter into the judgment. The fundamental confusion is very apparent when Dr. Marbe examines what he calls "judgment-ideas". The subjects had (1) to lift two weights successively and turn the heavier over ; (2) to whistle the note given by a tuning-fork ; (3; co glance at three sheets of paper and fix their gaze on the brightest. We are told that (1) "the activity of turning the weight," (2) " the reproduction " of the note, and (3) the fixation of the paper, may all be correct or incorrect and are therefore ideas which become judgments. But these activities are cer- tainly not merely ideas, and it is at least unusual to call them judgments. And for whom are they correct or incorrect ? For the outside observer, or for the subject himself ? Again there is a difference between the second and the first and third cases. In the second, the subject must first imitate the note, and may then perhaps judge his imitation correct; in the first and third he must judge one weight heavier or one colour brightest, and then behave in the required manner. T. LOVEDAY. Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Werttheorie. Von Dr. JOSEF CLEMENS KREIBIG, Privatdocenten an der K. K. Universitat zu Wien. Wien, 1902. Pp. 204. Another Austrian work on the psychology of the theory of Value ! Happily it is a comparatively short one this time. It is divided into eight parts. The first is a general introduction, giving a preliminary survey of the phenomena of value, and indications of some of the leading points of view. The second is on the psychology of feelings of value, and on general laws of value. The third deals with the psychology of the will in relation to value. The fourth is on the self-regarding aspect of value, including the foundations of Hygienics. The consideration of economic values comes under this heading. The fifth part deals with the other-regarding aspects of Value, and includes the foundations of Ethics. The sixth deals with the more impersonal (ergopathisch) aspects of value, including the foundations of ^Esthetics. The seventh deals with formulas of value, and the eighth with the bearings of the theory of value on edu- cation. The work as a whole is interesting and suggestive, but can hardly be called masterly. The division of values into self -regarding, other-regarding, and impersonal seems somewhat crude ; and no adequate attempt is made to justify it. J. S. M.