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 98 CEITICAL NOTICES: The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic : A General Intro- duction to Hegel's System. By J. B. BAILLIE, B.A. (Camb.), D.Phil. (Edin.), Lecturer in Philosophy at University Col- lege, Dundee. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901. THE two titles of this book characterise exactly the nature of its contents. We have in it a careful, conscientious study of the Logic of Hegel in its various phases of development, and an attempt to give an unprejudiced estimate of its permanent value. Three stages are recognised in the growth of Hegel's views of logic. The first extends from 1797 to 1800. Logic is here sharply differentiated from Metaphysics, but no consistent satisfactory account can be given of its function, because of the uncritical and tentative character of Hegel's system of philosophy at that time. During this period his interest was rather in religion than in philosophy. The change that came about in Hegel's attitude at the close of this period is " best described by saying that whereas formerly he had a religious interest in the object of philosophy, he has now a purely philosophical interest in the object of religion, the object in both cases being ultimately the same " (p. 60), viz. absolute reality. The second period (1800-1807) netted for Hegel as its results: "(1) the more complete grasp of his fundamental philosophical principle," that the Absolute is Mind ; " (2) the ascertainment of the nature and procedure of the instru- ment of philosophising," which consists of a synthesis of reflexion and intuition (Anschauung] ; " (3) the closer approximation of Logic to Metaphysic, through the assimilation of their content ; (4) the naming of the method to be employed in constructing a system," viz. the method of Development (p. 89). " In order to understand the line of development which leads Hegel to the position which he finally adopts, and the reason which induced him to alter the views which he held during the period we have just reviewed," i.e., the second period, " we must bear in mind the demands which from the first he expected philo- sophy to satisfy. These were that it should be the complete exposition of the knowledge of the Absolute, that the system of such knowledge should be determined by the inner connexion of its content, and that the nature of the Absolute should be shown to be Mind, Spirit (Geist). These are for Hegel simply assumptions, fundamental positions which must be held by those who would fulfil the task of philosophy. He does not seek to prove them at the outset ; rather he takes the only possible proof of them to be the actual realisation of them by philosophy " (p. 119). The exhibition of the Absolute as Mind is given in the Phenomen- ology of Mind. The Absolute as Mind " means that Mind is to embrace its object. It is not to exclude it (that would be Dual- ism) ; nor to negate it (that would be Solipsism) ; nor to be on a