Page:Michael Welsh - Dunes and Dreams, A History of White Sands National Monument (1995).pdf/66

 54 throughout the year, as Thomas C. Vint, chief NPS architect, argued for its placement on the edge of the dunes. Charles Richey claimed that Vint's idea had been scuttled (despite its inclusion in the master plan) because "Custodian Charles will arouse much local opposition to a permanent picnic site out of the better sands area." C.H. Gerner of the Washington NPS office had to remind his colleagues that disagreements over the picnic area endangered the substantial sums of New Deal money authorized for White Sands.

Further complicating construction at the dunes in 1937 were charges that political appointee John Happer had mismanaged contracts for the RDP facilities. In Flapper's defense, NPS officials realized in March that pressure to liquidate all WPA accounts by June 30 (the close of the fiscal year) meant acceleration of work, while new regulations demanded that 95 percent of all labor be from the unemployment rolls. The NPS regional office offered Happer the logic that haunted all New Deal programs: "If there is such balance of funds [on June 30] it will be a definite reflection upon the sincerity of our request for funds and on our ability to administer the project." Happer responded by asking permission to hire 100–110 workers to make adobe bricks for the pueblo-style architecture, and to send "a crew to the [Sacramento] mountains to cut vigos [sic], savinos [sic] and canales" for the roofing. Then in June, Happer received word that relief projects would be reduced 35 percent nationally, with White Sands to have only 70 workers for fiscal year 1938.

For reasons of fiscal and managerial reform, the NPS moved in July to replace Happer temporarily with John H. Veale of the western office in San Francisco. Happer had not been a park service hire, and replacing him fit the NPS strategy to assume control of all work within its units. "I find that conditions are rather more serious than we anticipated," Veale wrote to the regional office in Oklahoma City. He blamed Happer not for his "carelessness" but for his "lack of appreciation of accurate and proper job records, and insufficient administrative inspection." Happer would spend payroll sums for labor in the wrong categories, causing both shortfalls and excess balances. Worse was the failure to maintain proper inventories of materials, with no balances whatsoever. Given the increased volume of construction work on site, the NPS could no longer afford such employees as the politically connected Happer, replacing him permanently with the well-respected John Stephens.

Beyond the monument's boundaries, the state of New Mexico added to the pressure for quick completion of the visitors center and headquarters compound. More