Page:Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and Republican, Vol 1.djvu/449

Rh army, and the volunteers of the city, had all been repeatedly beaten in the valley both before and since the armistice. Nevertheless, Santa Anna, in spite of all these defeats and disasters at the Molino and Casa Mata, caused the bells of the city to be merrily rung for a victory, and sent forth proclamations by extraordinary couriers, in every direction, announcing the triumph of Mexican valor and arms!

On the morning of the 11th, Scott proceeded to carry out the remainder of his projected capture of the capital. His troops had been already for some time hovering around the southern gates, and he now surveyed them closely covered by General Pillow's division and Riley's brigade of Twigg's command, and then ordered Quitman from Coyoacan to join Pillow by daylight, before the southern gates. By night, however, the two Generals with their commands were to pass the two intervening miles between their position and Tacubaya where they would unite with Worth's division, while General Twiggs was left, with Riley, Captain Taylor and Steptoe, in front of the gates to manoeuvre, threaten, or make false attacks so as to occupy and deceive the enemy. General Smith's brigade was halted in supporting distance at San Angel, in the rear, till the morning of the 13th, so as to support our general depot at Mixcoac. This stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th and until the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for Santa Anna to recover from his delusion.

In the meanwhile preparations had been duly made for the operations on the west by the capture of Chapultepec. Heavy batteries were established and the bombardment and cannonade under Captain Huger, were commenced early on the morning of the 12th. Pillow and Quitman had been in position, as ordered, since early on the night of the 11th, and Worth was now commanded to hold his division in reserve near the foundry to support Pillow, while Smith was summoned to sustain Quitman. Twiggs still continued to inform us with his guns that he held the Mexicans on the defensive in that quarter and kept Santa Anna in constant anxiety. Scott's positions and strategy perfectly disconcerted him. One moment on the south—the next at Tacubaya—then reconnoitering the south again—and, at last, concentrating his forces so that they might be easily moved northward to Chapultepec or southward to the gate of San Antonio Abad. These movements rendered him constantly sensible of every hour's importance, yet he would not agree with the veteran Bravo who commanded Chapultepec and was convinced that the hill and castle would be the points assailed. During the whole of the 12th the American pieces, strengthened by the