Page:Mendoza v. WIS International, Inc.pdf/19

 in the Arkansas Mandatory Seat Belt Use Law, involves a broad prohibition on the admission of certain evidence that the legislature has determined to be not relevant in civil actions.

In comparison, the medical-costs provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act that was struck down by the Rockwell court dictated not only what evidence could be admitted, but also what foundational predicates would be required before that evidence could be admitted, which essentially invaded the circuit court's discretion in admitting evidence, which conflicts with the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Ark. R. Evid. 403. I am mindful that whenever a statute conflicts with a rule of evidence, it is a violation of the separation of powers. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, 386 S.W.3d 385. However, there is nothing in section 27-37-703 that conflicts with the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Thus, in my view, the majority has clearly erred in finding that, by enacting section 27-37-703, the legislature violated the separation-of-powers clause.

R K. W, Justice, dissenting. Because I think the majority's analysis is inherently flawed and only further confuses this court's application of amendment 80, § 3 of the Arkansas Constitution, I dissent. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 402 reads, "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute " Ark. R. Evid. 402 (2015) (emphasis added). Therefore, our Rule of Evidence, which this court alone may promulgate, permits the General Assembly to pass statutes regarding the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.

Inexplicably, the majority finds that our rules do not mean what they say. Instead of