Page:Memphis & Little Rock Railway Co. v. Berry.pdf/5

 force. The constitution contained the most stringent provisions against exemptions from taxation.—Art. X, Sec. 2; Art. V, Sec. 48. Section 1 of the Act of April 29, 1873, could not therefore exempt the corporation from the payment of any lawful tax.

The sale of the road and the organization of the present company took place in 1877, when the constitution of 1874 was in force. That constitution also contains stringent inhibitions of all special exemptions from taxation. Art. XVI. Secs. 5, 6, 7; Art. V, Sec. 25; Art. XII, Sec. 6.

The appellant says that it has not complied with the provisions of either of these statutes; but this assertion of its own dereliction is unavailing. It claims to be a corporation organized at a certain time, under the laws then in force. Non-compliance with those laws cannot give any more or larger rights than could have secured by a strict compliance; and as long as it claims to be a corporation it is estopped from saying that it is not bound by laws which would apply to it as a corporation, created when it asserts that it was created. Gaines v. Bank of Mississippi, 12 Ark., 769.

The word "charter," as used in the act of 1853, means no more than the franchise to operate the road. "Franchises" and "charter" are often loosely used as being synonymous. Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S., 221.

The exemption from taxation was a personal privilege or immunity granted to the old Memphis & Little Rock Railroad Company, and did not pass to the new company "as reorganized," dating from 1877. Morgan v. Louisiana, supra; Louisville Railroad Company v. Palmes, 3 Sup. Court Rep., 193; Trask v. McGuire, 18 Wall, 408; State v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St., 412. 

MARTIN, J. W., SPECIAL JUDGE. The appellant claiming to be exempt from the payment of taxes lay virtue of the