Page:Memory (1913).djvu/131

 name, a person could usually tell whether they agreed with the one now sought for but not yet found, or not. As a result of the frequent repetition of the syllables 1, 3, 5 previously connected with the syllables 2, 4, 6, the latter were placed in a similar slightly pronounced condition of excitation, lying between conscious appearance on the one side and simple non-appearance on the other. And this excitation has, as it now appears from our tests, a result altogether similar to that of actual return to consciousness. Inner connections are established between successively and internally aroused syllables just as between syllables successively raised to consciousness, except that the former are naturally of less strength. Secret threads are spun which bind together the series 2, 4, 6, not yet aroused to consciousness, and prepare the way for its conscious appearance. Such threads existed already in greater strength as a result of the learning of the original series; the present effect is that of strengthening somewhat connections already made. And that is nothing else than what was found above: if two syllable-combinations—1, 3, 5&hellip; and 2, 4, 6&hellip;—are frequently associated in consciousness (the learning of the original series) then the subsequent learning of the second combination (derived series II, IV, VI) soon after the learning of the first (derived series I, III, V) has considerably less resistance to overcome than the latter. A certain strengthening of associations takes place, not only directly, through conscious repetition of the associated members, but also indirectly through the conscious repetition of other members with which the first had been frequently connected.

This way of viewing the matter is a consequence of the assumption (which became necessary above, ) of the formation of associative connections over more intervening members than could be comprehended in one clearly conscious act. These connections would be very fruitful in the explanation of many surprising phenomena of memory and recollection, but on account of the uncertainty of their experiential basis I refrain for the present from pursuing them further.