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32 make it clear that any other committee doing that function, whatever it is called, will be given that function" take the matter any further. The language used is ambiguous, and is equally consistent, it seems to me with both of the alternative interpretations identified at paragraphs 18 and 19 above.

Conclusion

The question boils down to that of which of the two alternative interpretations that are set out at paragraphs 18 and 19 above is the better reading of subsections 1(4) and 1(7). Whilst both interpretations are perfectly arguable, my view, on balance, and for the reasons I have explained, is that the second interpretation is the better reading of the relevant provisions. In other words, the 'future-proofing' function of subsection 1(7) is not to preserve an exclusive area of competence of the Standards Committee or its successors, but is rather to bring within the scope of the second recall condition reports concerning the conduct of individual MPs made by other committees.

It follows that my answer to the issue framed at paragraph 6 above is in the affirmative - the second recall condition would be satisfied by a suspension of the requisite length ordered by the House of Commons following a report to the House made not by the Committee on Standards, but by the Committee on Privileges.

Finally on this point, I should add that I have read the Advice on this issue that has been prepared for the Good Law Project by Jason Coppel QC. I note that our conclusions – that, on balance, a report from the Privileges Committee can trigger a recall petition – are similar, albeit that the routes by which each of us has reached that conclusion are rather different.

ANDREW O'CONNOR QC

Temple Garden Chambers

London.

6 July 2022