Page:Mathematical collections and translations, in two tomes - Salusbury (1661).djvu/388

 which to the stability of the Earth it is necessary (forsaking that Symetry which is observed to be between the velocities and magnitudes of moveables) to ascribe to a Sphere, vast above all others, an unconceiveable celerity, whilst the other lesser Spheres move extream slowly; and which is more, to make that motion contrary to all their motions; and, yet again to adde to the improbability, to make that superiour Sphere forcibly to transport all the inferiour ones along with it contrary to their proper inclination. And here I refer it to your judgment to determine which of the two is the most probable.

To me, as far as concerneth sense, there appeareth no small difference betwixt the simplicity and facility of operating effects by the means assigned in this new constitution, and the multiplicity, confusion, and difficulty, that is found in the ancient and commonly received Hypothesis. For if the Universe were disposed according to this multiplicity, it would be necessary to renounce many Maximes in Philosophy commonly received by Philosophers, as for instance, That Nature doth not multiply things without necessity; and, That She makes use of the most facile and simple means in producing her effects; and, That She doth nothing in vain, and the like. I do confesse that I never heard any thing more admirable than this, nor can I believe that Humane Understanding ever penetrated a more sublime speculation. I know not what Simplicius may think of it.

These (if I may speak my judgment freely) do seem to me some of those Geometrical subtilties which Aristotle finds fault with in Plato, when he accuseth him that by his too much studying of Geometry he forsook solid Philosophy; and I have known and heard very great Peripatetick Philosophers to disswade their Scholars from the Study of the Mathematicks, as those that render the wit cavilous, and unable to philosophate well; an Institute diametrically contrary to that of Plato, who admitted one to Philosophy, unlesse he was first well entered in Geometry.

I commend the policy of these your Peripateticks, in dehorting their Disciples from the Study of Geometry, for that there is not art more commodious for detecting their fallacies; but see how they differ from the Mathematical Philosophers, who much more willingly converse with those that are well verst in the commune Peripatetick Philosophy, than with those that are destitute of that knowledg, who for want thereof cannot distinguish between doctrine and doctrine. But passing by this, tell me I beseech you, what are those extravagancies and those too affected subtilties that make you think this Copernican Systeme the lesse plausible?