Page:Mathematical collections and translations, in two tomes - Salusbury (1661).djvu/263

 I have twice or thrice observed in the discourses of this Authour, that to prove that a thing is so, or so, he still alledgeth, that in that manner it is conformable with our understanding; or that otherwise we should never be able to conceive of it; or that the Criterium of Philosophy would be overthrown. As if that nature had first made mens brains, and then disposed all things in conformity to the capacity of their intellects. But I incline rather to think that Nature first made the things themselves, as she best liked, and afterwards framed the reason of men capable of conceiving (though not without great pains) some part of her secrets.

I am of the same opinion. But tell me, Simplicius, which are these different natures, to which, contrary to experience and reason, Copernicus assignes the same motions and operations.

They are these. The Water, the Air, (which doubtlesse are Natures different from the Earth) and all things that are in those elements comprised, shall each of them have those three motions, which Copernicus pretends to be in the Terrestriall Globe; and my Authour proceedeth to demonstrate Geometrically, that, according to the Copernican Doctrine, a cloud that is suspended in the Air, and that hangeth a long time over our heads without changing place, must of necessity have all those three motions that belong to the Terrestrial Globe. The demonstration is this, which you may read your self, for I cannot repeat it without book.

I shall not stand reading of it, nay I think it an impertinency in him to have inserted it, for I am certain, that no Copernican will deny the same. Therefore admitting him what he would demonstrate, let us speak to the objection, which in my judgment hath no great strength to conclude any thing contrary to the Copernican Hypothesis, seeing that it derogates nothing from those motions, and those operations, whereby we come to the knowledge of the natures, &c. Answer me, I pray you, Simplicius: Those accidents wherein some things exactly concur, can they serve to inform us of the different natures of those things?

No Sir: nay rather the contrary, for from the idendity of operations and of accidents nothing can be inferred, but an idendity of natures.

So that the different natures of the Water, Earth, Air, and other things conteined in these Elements, is not by you argued from those operations, wherein all these Elements and their affixes agree, but from other operations; is it so?

The very same.

So that he who should leave in the Elements all those