Page:Mathematical collections and translations, in two tomes - Salusbury (1661).djvu/248

 an enterprize of pulling the new stars out of heaven, and placing them in the elementary Sphere, he shall be worthy to be highly exalted, and transferred himself amongst the stars, or at least, that his name be by fame eternized amongst them. Yet before we enter upon this, let us hear what he alledgeth against the opinion of Copernicus, and do you begin to recite his Arguments.

It will not be necessary that we read them ad verbum, because they are very prolix; but I, as you may see, in reading them several times attentively, have marked in the margine those words, wherein the strength of his arguments lie, and it will suffice to read them. The first Argument beginneth here. Et primo, si opinio Copernici recipiatur, Criterium naturalis Philosophiae, ni prorsus tollatur, vehementer saltem labefactari videtur. [In our Idiom thus] And first, if Copernicus his opinion be imbraced, the Criterium of natural Philosophy will be, if not wholly subverted, yet at least extreamly shaken.

Which, according to the opinion of all the sects of Philosophers requireth, that Sense and Experience be our guides in philosophating: But in the Copernican position the Senses are greatly deluded, whil'st that they visibly discover neer at hand in a pure Medium, the gravest bodies to descend perpendicularly downwards, never deviating a single hairs breadth from rectitude; and yet according to the opinion of Copernicus, the sight in so manifest a thing is deceived, and that motion is not reall straight, but mixt of right and circular.

This is the first argument, that Aristotle, Ptolomy, and all their followers do produce; to which we have abundantly answered, and shewn the Paralogisme, and with sufficient plainnesse proved, that the motion in common to us and other moveables, is, as if there were no such thing; but because true conclusions meet with a thousand accidents, that confirme them, I will, with the favour of this Philosopher, adde something more; and you Simplicius personating him, answer me to what I shall ask you: And first tell me, what effect hath that stone upon you, which falling from the top of the Tower, is the cause that you perceive that motion; for if its fall doth operate upon you neither more nor lesse, than its standing still on the Towers top, you doubtlesse could not discern its descent, or distinguish its moving from its lying still.

I comprehend its moving, in relation to the Tower, for that I see it one while just against such a mark in the said Tower, and another while against another lower, and so successively, till that at last I perceive it arrived at the ground.

Then if that stone were let fall from the tallons of an Eagle flying, and should descend thorow the simple invisible Air,