Page:Mary Whiton Calkins - The Idealist to the Realist (The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1911-08-17).pdf/1

. VIII. № 17

HIS paper attempts to consider briefly both the contemporary criticisms on idealism and the constructive theories advanced by the neo-realists.

The recent criticisms of idealism may be grouped under three main heads: first, those which oppose idealism on the ground that it is subversive of some important system of beliefs; second, those which charge idealism with fundamental inconsistency; and, third, those which claim that idealism is based on unjustifiable assumptions.

1. The charge that idealism flies in the face of common sense, of science, and of logic reappears in the writings of many realists. In the words of Professor Woodbridge, idealism “forces upon one a view of things which is not an extension and a refinement of [the] natural, instinctive view, but a radical transformation of it.” And Professor Spaulding introduces his summary of realistic doctrine with the statement that realism “agrees with common sense and with science.” In answer to this charge that idealism does not agree with “common sense” it may first be pointed out that final judgment on a technical system can not be passed on the basis of its agreement with popular beliefs. It would go hard with the scientists were ultimate physical theories thus rated; and constructive realism, as will later be argued, would fare no better. But the idealist need not content himself with this protest. There is much to favor the view that primitive philosophizing is rather spiritistic than materialistic. All children personify the stubborn walls and