Page:Mary Whiton Calkins - Kant's Conception of the Leibniz Space and Time Doctrine (The Philosophical Review, 1897-07-01).pdf/12

№ &#93; in kind as well as in degree, while space and time, as relations of things in themselves, would of course be known to thought. Moreover, even if it were properly inferred from the premises of Leibniz, the doctrine of space and time, as objects of confused consciousness, would find no justification in his definite teaching. For his occasional references are to extension, not to space, as object of perception; and more than once, when he differentiates confused and distinct consciousness, as in the discussion of Locke’s primary and secondary qualities, he calls extension intelligible and “capable of distinct explanation.”

The original of Kant’s picture, however, is not far to seek. Wolff’s definition of space is precisely in the form required: “Space consists in a certain constant and mutual relation of elements to themselves as a whole, so far as this is confusedly perceived by us.” Indeed, Kant himself virtually admits the hearsay character of his evidence concerning Leibniz. His most frequent appeals are to the followers of Leibniz, not to the philosopher himself, and in the specific opposition of the Dissertation to this last theory, explicitly refers it to Wolff, without mention of Leibniz.

Kant’s persuasion that Leibniz believes space and time to be objects of confused sense-consciousness explains an apparent inconsistency in his criticism. This has presupposed almost throughout that Leibniz treats space and time as relations of things in themselves. It is therefore very misleading to meet, not infrequently, the assertion that Leibniz believes space and time to be relations of phenomena and of phenomenal states. Some of these statements may perhaps be treated as mere verbal slips,—the reference, for instance, in the first