Page:Mary Whiton Calkins - Kant's Conception of the Leibniz Space and Time Doctrine (The Philosophical Review, 1897-07-01).pdf/10

№ &#93; It is clear that a large part of Kant’s space and time discussion is virtually a refutation of this theory, attributed to Leibniz and to Newton, of their external reality. The mathematical arguments of the Dissertation, Aesthetik, and Prolegomena prove the subjectivity of space and time, Kant argues, by proving their a priori nature: Leibniz and his supporters are sufficiently condemned when it is shown that they are making an open attack upon geometry (geometriae adversa fronte repugnant). The Antinomies also definitely direct themselves against the doctrine of the objective reality. But by far the largest part of Kant’s criticism relates itself to an important consequence of the doctrine that space and time are real relations of real things and events; that is, to the teaching, which Kant attributes to Leibniz, that our consciousness of space and of time is an empirical, a posteriori consciousness, a mere passive being impressed by these relations, which are external to us and independent of us. This consequence of the (supposed) Leibnizian theory is clearly recognized and opposed in the Dissertation. “The notion of time,“ Kant says, “is wretchedly defined as gained from experience.” Space,” he continues, “is not abstracted from external sensations.” In precisely similar fashion, arguments and  of the Aesthetik refer to the conception of space as an empirical concept, derived (abgezogen) from external experience”; and again as a “general concept of the relations of things in general.” Leibniz is not named, but a marginal note in Kant’s Handexemplar connects the doctrine with him by the definite words, wie Leibniz meynt. Later, Kant