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 already rejected. And on pages 42 through 48, they challenge Officer Garcia’s actions, claiming he lacked “official knowledge of a bench warrant," and did not possess the warrant at the time of the arrest. Aplt. Br. at 42. But it is undisputed that Officer Garcia stopped Ms. Martinez after running a license-plate check on her carand finding the outstanding warrant. See Aplee. App. at 641-42 (Garcia Aff.).

Finally, on pages 48 and 49, Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero argue that the County of Santa Fe is not entitled to immunity as a municipal corporation, but the district court never made such a ruling and, once again, appellants fail to explain how this argument addresses the district court’s grant of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity to Judge Miera, Deputies Webb and Nissen, and Officer Garcia.

Because Ms. Martinez and Mr. Romero are proceeding pro se, we construe their filings liberally. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). So construed, “we make some allowances for [their] failure to cite proper legal authority, [their] confusion of various legal theories, [their] poor syntax and sentence construction, or [their] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements, [but we] cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [their] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record." Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).Indeed, we have consistently required pro se litigants to follow the same procedural

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