Page:Margaret Hamilton of Rockhall v Lord Lyon King of Arms.pdf/23

 :5. In any event, any losses that the pursuer avers would be caused by a departure from the policy position set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Agreement, would be caused to the partnership of which she avers she is a partner. As a Scottish firm, that partnership has separate legal personality. The Agreement cannot properly be interpreted as intended to confer a benefit on the pursuer in her capacity as a partner in that firm, or upon the firm itself: the partnership was not a party to the petition to the Lord Lyon, the judicial review proceedings or the Agreement. The pursuer has no interest to sue upon paragraphs 4 or 5 of the Agreement.


 * 6. If, contrary to the defender's contention, paragraphs 4 and 5 were undertakings by Lyon Sellar to the pursuer and Dr Lindberg jointly, then both those parties would require to join in vindicating the correlative right, for those paragraphs do not distinguish between them and the undertakings, construed as the pursuer would have it, must be seen as undertaken as an indivisible obligation: see Grange Trust Trustees v City of Edinburgh Council [2017] CSOH 102 per Lord Boyd at paragraphs 13–26 ("Grange Trust Trustees").


 * 7. No petitioner may require the Lord Lyon to grant warrant for Letters Patent with specific wording. The reference in paragraph 4 of the Agreement to "if required" is therefore wrong in law. An application for arms proceeds in the manner described in the information leaflet (this was lodged at no 7/9 of Process at page 4). As that leaflet explains, the Letters Patent are a formal title deed from the Crown granting the arms. That is their function. Since the