Page:Mallory v. Norfolk Southern.pdf/63

Rh 175 (1939) (basing jurisdiction on “finding an actual consent” (emphasis added)). As Judge Learned Hand emphasized in a decision invoked by the plurality, without “express consent,” the normal rules apply. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150–151 (SDNY 1915).

The express power of attorney in Pennsylvania Fire “made service on the [insurance] superintendent the equivalent of … a corporate vote [that] had accepted service in this specific case.” 243 U. S., at 95. Norfolk Southern, by contrast, “executed no document like the power of attorney there.” Brief for Respondent 31; see App. 1–7. The Court makes much of what Norfolk Southern did write on its forms, : It named a “Commercial Registered Office Provider,” App. 1, 6, it notified Pennsylvania of a merger, id., at 3–5, and it paid $70 to update its paperwork, id., at 6. None of those documents use the word “agent,” nothing hints at the word “jurisdiction,” and (as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained) nothing about that registration is “voluntary.” 266 A. 3d, at 570, and n. 20. Consent in Pennsylvania Fire was contained in the document itself; here it is deemed by statute. If “mere formalities” matter as much as the plurality says they do, it should respect this one too.

By now, it should be clear that the plurality’s primary approach to this case is to look past our personal jurisdiction