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16 “framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States”—are not a valid basis for general jurisdiction. Daimler, 571 U. S., at 140, n. 20. The only innovation of Pennsylvania’s statute is to make “doing business” synonymous with “consent.” If Pennsylvania Fire endorses that trick, then Pennsylvania Fire is no longer good law.

The plurality tries to get around International Shoe by claiming that it did no more than expand jurisdiction, affecting nothing that came before it. That is as fictional as the old concept of “corporate presence” on which the plurality relies. We have previously abandoned even “ancient” bases of jurisdiction for incompatibility with International Shoe. Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 211–212 (repudiating quasi in rem jurisdiction). And we have repeatedly reminded litigants not to put much stock in our pre-International Shoe decisions. Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 212, n. 39; see also BNSF, 581 U. S., at 412. Daimler itself reinforces that pre-International Shoe decisions “should not attract heavy reliance today.” 571 U. S., at 138, n. 18. Over and over, we have reminded litigants that International Shoe is “canonical,” “seminal,” “pathmarking,” and even “momentous”—to give just a few examples. Ford Motor, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 262; Daimler, 571 U. S., at 128; Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 919. Yet the Court acts as if none of this ever happened.

In any event, I doubt Pennsylvania Fire would control this case even if it remained valid. Pennsylvania Fire distinguished between express consent (that is, consent “actually … conferred by [the] document”) and deemed consent (inferred from doing business). 243 U. S., at 95–96; see also Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165,