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8 to the Commonwealth intrudes on the prerogatives of other States—domestic and foreign—to adjudicate the rights of their citizens and enforce their own laws. See Ford Motor, 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7); Daimler, 571 U. S., at 141–142.

The plurality’s response is to fall back, yet again, on “consent.”,. In its view, because a defendant can waive its personal jurisdiction right, a State can never overreach in demanding its relinquishment. Ibid.; see also (opinion of );  (opinion of ). That is not how we treat rights with structural components. The right to remove a case to federal court, for instance, is primarily personal—it secures for a nonresident defendant a federal forum thought to be more impartial. See The Federalist No. 80, p. 478 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). At the same time, however, it serves federal interests by ensuring that federal courts can vindicate federal rights. See, e.g., Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, 804–805 (1966). Recognizing this dual role, we have rejected efforts of States to require defendants to relinquish this (waivable) right to removal as a condition of doing business. See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 453, 456–458 (1874) (citing Lafayette, 18 How., at 407); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 196–198 (1887) (“[W]hile the right to remove a suit might be waived,” a statute may not require a foreign corporation “to forfeit [its] rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case might be presented”). The same logic applies here. Pennsylvania’s power grab infringes on more than just the rights of defendants—it upsets the proper role of the States in our federal system.

The plurality attempts to minimize the novelty of its conclusion by pointing to our decision in