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4 . We rejected Montana’s assertion of general jurisdiction over BNSF because “in-state business … does not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims … that are unrelated to any activity occurring in [the State].” Id., at 414. Daimler and Goodyear, we explained, could not have made that any clearer. BNSF, 581 U. S., at 414.

The same rule applies here. The Pennsylvania statute announces that registering to do business in the Commonwealth “shall constitute a sufficient basis” for general jurisdiction. §5301(a). But as our precedent makes crystal clear, simply doing business is insufficient. Absent an exceptional circumstance, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only in a State where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. Ford Motor, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5); Daimler, 571 U. S., at 139; Goodyear, 564 U. S., at 924. Adding the antecedent step of registration does not change that conclusion. If it did, “every corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and Daimler’s ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back-door thief.” Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F. 3d 619, 640 (CA2 2016).

The Court short-circuits this precedent by characterizing this case as one about consent rather than contacts-based jurisdiction. Consent is an established basis for personal jurisdiction, which is, after all, a waivable defense. “A variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court,” including contract, stipulation, and in-court appearance. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 703–704. Today, the Court adds corporate registration to the list.