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14 for Tanya Monestier as Amicus Curiae 16. States, meanwhile, “would externalize the costs of [their] plaintiff-friendly regimes.” Brief for Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae 26.

Given these serious burdens, to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny under this Court’s framework, the law must advance a “ ‘legitimate local public interest’ ” and the burdens must not be “ ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ ” Wayfair, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But I am hard-pressed to identify any legitimate local interest that is advanced by requiring an out-of-state company to defend a suit brought by an out-of-state plaintiff on claims wholly unconnected to the forum State. A State certainly has a legitimate interest in regulating activities conducted within its borders, which may include providing a forum to redress harms that occurred within the State. ''State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408, 422 (2003); BMW of North America, 517 U. S., at 568–569; Hess v. Pawloski'', 274 U. S. 352, 356 (1927). A State also may have an interest “in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.” Burger King, 471 U. S., at 473. But a State generally does not have a legitimate local interest in vindicating the rights of non-residents harmed by out-of-state actors through conduct outside the State. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 644 (1982). With no legitimate local interest served, “there is nothing to be weighed … to sustain the law.” Ibid. And even if some legitimate local interest could be identified, I am skeptical that any local benefits of the State’s assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances could overcome the serious burdens on interstate commerce that it imposes. See, e.g., id., at 643–646; Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U. S., at 444–446.

Because Pennsylvania Fire resolves this case in favor of