Page:Mallory v. Norfolk Southern.pdf/42

Rh was “in no way connected with Minnesota.” Id., at 314. Jurisdiction over the railroad was based on its compliance with a state statute regulating the in-state activities of out-of-state corporations: the railroad maintained a soliciting agent in Minnesota, and the Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted state law as compelling out-of-state carriers, as a “condition of maintaining a soliciting agent,” to “submit to suit” in Minnesota on any “cause of action, wherever it may have arisen.” Id., at 315.

The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction against the railroad, but we reversed, holding that Minnesota’s condition “impos[ed] upon interstate commerce a serious and unreasonable burden, which renders the statute obnoxious to the [C]ommerce [C]lause.” Ibid. “By requiring from interstate carriers general submission to suit,” Minnesota’s statute “unreasonably obstruct[ed], and unduly burden[ed], interstate commerce.” Id., at 317.

Although we have since refined our Commerce Clause framework, the structural constitutional principles underlying these decisions are unchanged, and the Clause remains a vital constraint on States’ power over out-of-state corporations.

In my view, there is a good prospect that Pennsylvania’s assertion of jurisdiction here—over an out-of-state company in a suit brought by an out-of-state plaintiff on claims wholly unrelated to Pennsylvania—violates the Commerce Clause.

Under our modern framework, a state law may offend the Commerce Clause’s negative restrictions in two circumstances: when the law discriminates against interstate