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Rh

, concurring.

I agree with the Court that this case is straightforward under our precedents. I write separately to say that, for me, what makes it so is not just our ruling in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917). I also consider our ruling in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694 (1982), to be particularly instructive.

In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, this Court confirmed a simple truth: The due process “requirement of personal jurisdiction” is an individual, waivable right. Id., at 703. The requirement exists, we said, to ensure that the forum State has sufficient contacts with a defendant, such that “ ‘the maintenance of the suit [does] not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” Ibid. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 319 (1945)). We noted further that the interstate federalism concerns informing that right are “ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest” that this due process right preserves. 456 U. S., at 703, n. 10. Because the personal-jurisdiction right belongs to the defendant, however, we explained that a defendant can choose to “subject [itself] to powers from which [it] may otherwise be protected.” Ibid. When that happens, a State can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with the Due Process Clause, even