Page:Mallory v. Norfolk Southern.pdf/24

Rh Perhaps sensing its arguments from fairness meet a dead end, Norfolk Southern ultimately heads in another direction altogether. It suggests the Due Process Clause separately prohibits one State from infringing on the sovereignty of another State through exorbitant claims of personal jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent 16–19; see (opinion of ). And, in candor, the company is half right. Some of our personal jurisdiction cases have discussed the federalism implications of one State’s assertion of jurisdiction over the corporate residents of another. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 263 (2017). But that neglects an important part of the story. To date, our personal jurisdiction cases have never found a Due Process Clause problem sounding in federalism when an out-of-state defendant submits to suit in the forum State. After all, personal jurisdiction is a personal defense that may be waived or forfeited. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 704–705; see also (opinion of );  (opinion of ).

That leaves Norfolk Southern one final stand. It argues that it has not really submitted to proceedings in Pennsylvania. Brief for Respondent 11–13; see, (opinion of ). The company does not dispute that it has filed paperwork with Pennsylvania seeking the right to do business there. It does not dispute that it has established an office in the Commonwealth to receive service of process on any claim. It does not dispute that it appreciated the jurisdictional consequences attending these actions and proceeded anyway, presumably because it thought the benefits outweighed the costs. But, in the name of the Due Process Clause, Norfolk Southern insists we should dismiss all