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 present a conspicuous target which attracts fire and renders their withdrawal difficult.

We made this mistake in the South African War more than once. At Rietfontein the machine-gun detachment of the Gloucester Regiment, which had followed the battalion into the firing line, was almost annihilated. At Modder River the Scots Guards Maxim gun accompanied the firing line, and the detachment was annihilated by pom-pom fire, and the gun was left on the field alone all day. In the attack on Cronje's laager at Paardeberg, machine guns were used in the firing line on the left bank of the river, and when the attack failed the machine guns, having suffered severe losses, could not be withdrawn and had to be abandoned till nightfall.

When the covering fire of machine guns is no longer considered necessary, they should be withdrawn and concentrated in batteries in rear of the reserve or in such other convenient position as the G.O.C. may direct. They should take this opportunity of refilling belts, replenishing ammunition, water, etc., and if the guns have fired many thousand rounds, of exchanging barrels.[B] They are now at the immediate disposal of the G.O.C. and will be used by him as a mobile reserve. Circumstances vary so in war that it is impossible to particularize in their use at this stage, but their great mobility will render them extremely valuable in the following cases:[Footnote B: A Japanese machine gun fired 25,000 rounds in one day in