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10 unusual to ascribe jurisdictional significance to a condition subject to these sorts of exceptions,” ibid.

Similarly, given §363(m)’s clear expectation that courts will exercise jurisdiction over a covered authorization, it is surely permissible to read its text as merely cloaking certain good-faith purchasers or lessees with a targeted protection of their newly acquired property interest, applicable even when an appellate court properly exercises jurisdiction. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004) (statutory provision was not jurisdictional, for it did not speak to the “ ‘classes of cases’ ” the court was “competent to adjudicate” but to “proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court’s adjudicatory authority”). In other words, §363(m) reads like a “statutory limitation,” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516, that is tied in some instances to the need for a party to take “certain procedural steps at certain specified times” (here, seeking a stay), Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435. And we certainly cannot say that §363(m)’s “jurisdictional nature” is “clear ex visceribus verborum,” as we once did of a statutory provision directing that “ ‘[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over [a covered] action,’ ” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U. S. 457, 467–468 (2007).

Statutory context further clinches the case. Congress separated §363(m) from the Code provisions that recognize federal courts’ jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters. See 28 U. S. C. §§1334(a)–(b), (e), 157, 158; see also Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515 (emphasizing separation as evidence of nonjurisdictional status). And §363(m) does not contain any “clear tie” to the Code’s plainly jurisdictional provisions. Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). Nor does the Code lack for examples of such ties: Consider 11 U. S. C. §305(c),