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8 be it.” Sears II, 616 B. R., at 627. But not even such egregious conduct by a litigant could permit the application of judicial estoppel as against a jurisdictional rule.

In view of these consequences and our past sometimes-loose use of the word “jurisdiction,” we have endeavored “to bring some discipline” to this area. Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435. We have clarified that jurisdictional rules pertain to “ ‘ “the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.” ’ ” Reed Elsevier, 559 U. S., at 161. And we only treat a provision as jurisdictional if Congress “ ‘clearly states’ ” as much. Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).

This clear-statement rule implements “Congress’ likely intent” regarding whether noncompliance with a precondition “governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435–436. We have reasoned that Congress ordinarily enacts preconditions to facilitate the fair and orderly disposition of litigation and would not heedlessly give those same rules an unusual character that threatens to upend that orderly progress. Wilkins v. United States, 598 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2023) (slip op., at 3–4); Hamer, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (jurisdictional character is an exception “to the ordinary operation of our adversarial system”); Fort Bend County, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (noting the sometimes “ ‘[h]arsh’ ” consequences of enforcement of jurisdictional rules, including waste of judicial resources and unfairness to the litigants).

That said, Congress need not use “ ‘magic words’ ” to convey its intent that a statutory precondition be treated as jurisdictional. Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). “ ‘[T]raditional tools of statutory construction’ ” can reveal a clear statement. Ibid. But the statement must indeed be clear; it is insufficient that a jurisdictional reading is “plausible,” or even “better,” than nonjurisdictional alternatives. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6).