Page:Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools.pdf/5

Rh read the statute, we agreed to take up the question. Compare Perez, 3 F. 4th, at 241–242; McMillen v. New Caney Independent School Dist., 939 F. 3d 640, 647–648 (CA5 2019), with ''D. D. ex rel. Ingram v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 18 F. 4th 1043, 1059–1061 (CA9 2021) (Bumatay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Doucette v. Georgetown Public Schools'', 936 F. 3d 16, 31 (CA1 2019).

Section 1415(l) contains two salient features. First, the statute sets forth this general rule: “Nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict” the ability of individuals to seek “remedies” under the ADA or “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” Second, the statute offers a qualification, prohibiting certain suits with this language: “[E]xcept that before the filing of a civil action under such [other federal] laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” In turn, subsections (f) and (g) provide affected children and their parents with the right to a “due process hearing” before a local or state administrative official, §1415(f)(1)(A), followed by an “appeal” to the state education agency, §1415(g)(1).

The parties offer very different interpretations of §1415(l). Mr. Perez reads the statute to require a plaintiff to exhaust the administrative processes found in subsections (f) and (g) only to the extent he pursues a suit under another federal law for remedies IDEA also provides. None of this, Mr. Perez contends, forecloses his current claim because his ADA complaint seeks only compensatory damages, a remedy everyone before us agrees IDEA cannot supply. By contrast, Sturgis reads §1415(l) as requiring a plaintiff to exhaust subsections (f) and (g) before he may pursue a suit under another federal law if that suit seeks relief for the same underlying harm IDEA exists to address. On this view, the law bars Mr. Perez’s ADA suit because it