Page:Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (2013).pdf/7

4 Rh was “capable” of transportation because it could float, it could proceed under tow, and its shore connections (power cable, water hose, rope lines) did not rende[r] it practically incapable of transportation or movement. 649 F.3d, at 1266 (quoting Belle of Orleans, supra, at 1312, in turn quoting Stewart, 543 U.S., at 494). At least for argument’s sake we agree with the Court of Appeals about the last-mentioned point, namely that Lozman’s shore connections did not render the home practically incapable of transportation. But unlike the Eleventh Circuit, we do not find these considerations (even when combined with the home’s other characteristics) sufficient to show that Lozman’s home was a “vessel.”

The Court of Appeals recognized that it had applied the term “capable” broadly. 649 F. 3d, at 1266. Indeed, it pointed with approval to language in an earlier case, Burks v. ''American River Transp. Co.'', 679 F.2d 69 (1982), in which the Fifth Circuit said:


 * No doubt the three men in a tub would also fit within our definition, and one probably could make a convincing case for Jonah inside the whale. 649 F.3d, at 1269 (brackets omitted) (quoting Burks, supra, at 75).

But the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation is too broad. Not every floating structure is a “vessel.” To state the obvious, a wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio (when inside the whale) are not “vessels,” even if they are “artificial contrivance[s]” capable of floating, moving under tow, and incidentally carrying even a fair-sized item or two when they do so. Rather, the statute applies to an “artificial contrivance ... capable of being used ... as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. §3 (emphasis added). “[T]ransportation” involves the “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to