Page:Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach (2013).pdf/13

10 Rh Houseboat, No. 09–3292, 2009 WL 3379923, *5–*6 (D NJ, Oct. 19, 2009) (following Miami River Boat Yard); Hudson Harbor 79th Street Boat Basin, Inc. v. Sea Casa, 469 F. Supp. 987, 989 (SDNY 1979) (same). Cf. Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co., 437 F.3d 441 (CA5 2006) (floating dormitory); ''Summerlin v. Massman Constr. Co.'', 199 F.2d 715 (CA4 1952) (derrick anchored in the river engaged in building a bridge is a vessel). For the reasons we have stated, we find such an approach inappropriate and inconsistent with our precedents.

Further, our examination of the purposes of major federal maritime statutes reveals little reason to classify floating homes as “vessels.” Admiralty law, for example, provides special attachment procedures lest a vessel avoid liability by sailing away. 46 U.S.C. §§31341–31343 (2006 ed. and Supp. IV). Liability statutes such as the Jones Act recognize that sailors face the special perils of the sea. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354, 373 (1995) (referring to vessel[s] in navigation). Certain admiralty tort doctrines can encourage shipowners to engage in port-related commerce. E.g., 46 U.S.C. §30505; Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 269–270 (1972). And maritime safety statutes subject vessels to U.S. Coast Guard inspections. E.g., 46 U.S.C. §3301.

Lozman, however, cannot easily escape liability by sailing away in his home. He faces no special sea dangers. He does not significantly engage in port-related commerce. And the Solicitor General tells us that to adopt a version of the “anything that floats” test would place unnecessary and undesirable inspection burdens upon the Coast Guard. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 11.

Finally, our conclusion is consistent with state laws in States where floating home owners have congregated in communities. See Brief for Seattle Floating Homes Association et al. as Amici Curiae 1. A Washington State