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8 We express no position on the Government’s view of double jeopardy, because even assuming it, arguendo, the Government’s view does not refute our holding on the question presented. The Government says someone cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same conduct. But that aligns with our conclusion here: If a defendant receives a sentence under subsection (j), he does not receive a sentence “imposed … under [subsection (c)]” that would trigger the consecutive-sentence mandate. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Accordingly, the Government’s view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with our view that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate.

The Government protests that it is “implausible” that Congress imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under subsection (c) but not subsection (j), which covers more serious offense conduct. Brief for United States 9, 28–35. Yet that result is consistent with other design features of the statute.

Congress plainly chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than in subsection (c). Subsection (c), first enacted in 1968, is full of mandatory penalties. It contains mandatory minimum years of imprisonment and mandatory consecutive sentences. In fact, when subsection (j) was enacted in 1994, subsection (c) specified not just mandatory minimums, but exact mandatory terms of imprisonment. 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (e.g., exactly five years of imprisonment for the base subsection (c) offense).

Subsection (j), by contrast, generally eschews mandatory penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains no mandatory minimums. Even for murder, subsection (j) expressly permits a sentence of “any term of years.” §924(j)(1) (emphasis added).