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x unavoidable. With regard to that radical difference itself Bacon’s remark applies, behind which I must shelter myself from any change of presumption.—“Quod ad universalem istam reprehensionem attinet, certissimum vere est rem reputanti, eam et magis probabilem esse et magis modestam, quam si facta fuisset ex parte.”

Almost the only writer who seems to me to have expressed a just view of the nature and foundation of the rules of Probability is Mr Mill, in his System of Logic. His treatment of the subject is however very brief, and a considerable portion of the space which he has devoted to it is occupied by the discussion of one or two special examples. There are moreover some errors, as it seems to me, in what he has written, which will be referred to in some of the following chapters.

The reference to the work just mentioned will serve to convey a general idea of the view of Probability adopted in this Essay. With what may be called the Material view of Logic as opposed to the Formal or Conceptualist,—with that which regards it as taking cognisance of laws of things and not of the laws of our own minds in thinking about things,—I am in entire accordance. Of the province of Logic, regarded from this point of view, and under its widest aspect, Probability may, in my opinion, be considered to be a portion. The principal objects of this Essay are to ascertain how great a portion it comprises, where we are to draw the boundary between it and the contiguous branches of the general science