Page:Littell's Living Age - Volume 133.djvu/304

 not yet determined by any special law; but as regards its main element — the infantry — no doubt is possible, for everybody knows that the companies are to be composed of two hundred and fifty men each. It is only as regards the cavalry, artillery, and train that any real uncertainty exists, and for those special arms the margin of possible error is limited. We may consequently adopt with tolerable confidence the following approximate computation of the fighting force of a French corps d'armee: —

It will contain — Say 35,000

It results, therefore, from these figures, that although 1,300,000 men would be available in the event of a mobilization, only 990,000 of them could be utilized in the ranks in the first instance. The other 310,000 would remain en disponibilité at the depots, to fill up gaps as they arose.

An additional force of 25,000 excellent soldiers would be supplied by the coast and forest guards, all of whom have now received a military organization.

As regards mere numbers, therefore, the result is clear: France has positively more men than she can use. Measured by quantity alone, a mobilization would produce too much.

But quantity and quality are not identical. The new army laws have not been in force long enough to have made all Frenchmen into capable soldiers; and out of the 1,300,000 men who form the mobilizable total, it is certain that, at this moment, not more than 750,000 are really educated. Of the remainder it may be estimated that about 300,000 have had six months' drilling, while 250,000 have never served at all. Still, as all the men of the two latter categories would of course be placed, in the first instance, in the reserves, it is quite possible that they would have time to learn their business, partially, at least, before they were sent out to fight. Consequently we may fairly say, not only that quantity is abundant, but also that quality is sufficient.

And now we reach the second part of the mobilization — the concentration. On this point we are altogether in the dark; for it is impossible to foresee the political or strategic conditions under which a war-mobilization might have to. be effected. The minister of war himself could not speak with any certainty on the question, especially as, in the case of a defensive campaign (and that is the sole theory admissible in the present case), the defender can initiate nothing and must necessarily adapt his own movements to those of the invader. It will, however, surprise nobody to learn that the French Staff Office has at last applied the Prussian system of drawing up a plan of action at the commencement of each year — an "academical" project, as the Germans call it. An attack is supposed; its possible conditions are conjectured and weighed, and, according to the then situation of the French army and to the available information of the state of the other side, a scheme of resistance is prepared. An imaginary mobilization is composed on paper; the probable points of concentration are indicated; the corps d'armée are grouped up into fighting armies; their commanders are selected; everything is prepared. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the details of all this are kept profoundly secret; but the fact that it is done is known, and that fact supplies a striking proof of the progress which has been effected.

As regards the exact nature of the concentration, therefore, nothing whatever can be said. But as regards the time it would occupy, we are able to make reasonable guesses. Could both mobilization and 