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 1875; more vigor has been thrown into the management; in many directions energy has been substituted for routine; force has gone on steadily accumulating; and, though defects of system and of management are still terribly numerous, though a large variety of points are still open to just criticism, the organization is so advanced, the general improvement is so real, that it may now be said, at last, that France has indisputably an army.

The causes of this amelioration are distinctly evident. Abundance of money is the foremost of them all; France has been able to pay for what she needed. The steady, zealous action of the regimental officers is, as manifestly, the second source of strength. And next may be classed, successively, the influences of opinion, of time, of experience, and of accumulated labor.

The war minister has been changed. General Berthaut has replaced General de Cissey. The new-comer is a man of undeniable ability and of much scientific knowledge. His book "Des Marches et des Combats" is, perhaps, though rather too condensed, the cleverest composition which has been written by a French officer since the war. He is excessively laborious. But his great qualities are mixed up with little ones: he is constitutionally afraid of trusting anybody, and tries, therefore, to do everything himself; as a necessary consequence he gets into arrears with his work, and he is of course cordially disliked by his bureaux. Still, in the utter dearth of genius which so strangely distinguishes the present generation of Frenchmen, General Berthaut may be regarded as a valuable functionary.

He is struggling honestly to root out faults and to suppress abuses; he is fighting conscientiously not only against disorder, but also against — what is almost as bad — too much order. With time he may succeed; but he has still a tremendous deal to do. Many of the gravest of the old deficiencies remain unremedied. The Intendance, for instance, is still in the same unsatisfactory position as before. A law has been brought forward about it, but though that law has passed the Senate it has not yet been discussed in the Chamber. The Intendance is still the marrowless institution which we saw hobbling through its work in 1870; it still fondly clings to its immemorial feebleness and to its hereditary defects. Even at the last autumn manœuvres, where every movement was exactly known beforehand, it seems to have felt that it would be a disgrace to it to do its work properly; so, to keep up its traditions, the troops were left occasionally without food. Whether the proposed new law will change all this remains to be seen. Its principle is, that the Intendance shall be deprived of independent action, and that it shall work exclusively and entirely under the orders of the general commanding. It therefore introduces unity into the army, and destroys the duality of powers which has thus far existed. With generals who are really generals this change would indisputably be a progress; but it may most legitimately be doubted whether actual French commanders, taken as a whole, and excluding certain brilliant exceptions, will be able to direct the feeding of their soldiers any better than they direct their movements. The system is a wise one; but where are the men who are to apply it?

It is consoling to be able to turn one's eyes elsewhere, and to recognize that, in certain other directions, the march ahead has been prodigious. The system of tactics has been entirely changed; and in no army in the world is the substitution of open order for close formations likely to produce better results. The new règlement des manœuvres is considered to be the best in Europe. It is admirably fitted to the temperament of the French soldier, and will enable him to exercise his personal qualities. If that règlement had been in force on the 14th and 16th of August 1870, it is not impossible that the battles of Borny and of Rézonville would have been victories for France. The matériel is, at last, almost entirely reconstructed; the fortresses and the intrenched camps which have been established to defend the open frontier are nearly finished — some of them, indeed, are already armed, stored, and victualled for a siege; the more essential of the new forts round Paris are terminated, armed, and even garrisoned. To do all this, one hundred and sixty millions sterling have been laid out upon the army in the five years between 1872 and 1876; ninety millions thereof have gone in ordinary annual expenditure, and seventy millions for special outlay on matériel and defences. The result is, that France has now reached a point at which she can at last begin, if necessary, to use the instrument she has created.

What would happen if she needed it? How would she manage a mobilization of her forces? On previous occasions we have examined principles of direction and systems of organization; in 1875 we looked 