Page:Littell's Living Age - Volume 129.djvu/187

Rh "Aristides." The "Sage," the "Just"—such were the titles of honour plentifully bestowed upon him during this second epoch of his public career.

It was after the deep humiliation of the kaiser on the Lombard plain in 1859, that Hungary won her first triumph. Without that military event, all the exertions of Deak would have been of little avail. The defender of constitutional legality, who personally discountenanced the use of force, could never have made his voice in the Hofburg so impressive as the roar of guns. Yet, years afterwards, he who in the Hungarian Diet had once manifested his sympathy with the Polish cause, set his face, after Cavour's death, against any solemn celebration in honour of the Italian statesman. Italian Democrats—Garibaldi before all—may have cause to hold Cavour in a different estimate from what the world at large does, which only looks to outward success. Deak's opposition came from narrower views. If he, even after the striking changes that had taken place in Europe, still bore a grudge to Cavour, it was because his own constitutionalism was of a somewhat cramped cast, formed in the mould of the Pragmatic Sanction. But these blemishes, though slightly marring, leave unmutilated his great merits.

For seven years after the loss of Lombardy by Austria, Deak carried on the legal battle for the fuller recognition of Hungarian claims. "A country's rights," he used to say, "are not private property that can be freely disposed of." The more advanced elements, at that time, began to gather round Teleki, in whom the principles of 1849 were still vivid. After the mysterious death of Count Teleki—who, in the last interview I had with him, seemed to hope for a rapid development of public spirit in Hungary, in the sense of the previous revolutionary epoch—Francis Deak became the undisputed leader of the liberal party.

In vain did Kossuth endeavour to cross Deak's path. Whilst the latter strove to regain for Hungary the time-honoured rights of self-government in an amended constitutional form, the exiled leader came out with a programme which would have overthrown the historical basis of the country, and opened the flood-gates of panslavism upon the Magyar race. Down to the Crimean war, Kossuth had been the steadfast champion of the Magyar nationality. Before 1848, he had even, now and then, overstepped the boundary which the strangely mixed condition of Hungary naturally indicates to a statesman when the conflicting claims of race and speech are to be settled. Towards Croats and Serbs, Kossuth had almost been an ultra-Magyar. At all events, he had his eyes wide open to the dangers of panslavism. This line of thought strongly marks still his powerful speeches in England and in the United States between 1851 and 1852, when he styled panslavism "a Russian plot—a dark design to make, out of national feelings, a tool for Russian preponderance over the world."

In his harangues during the Crimean war, which were apparently calculated to urge a more efficient strategy, some expressions occurred, however, which showed that he was entering on a new line. Shortly before Louis Napoleon attacked Austria in Italy, Kossuth declared that he would ally himself even to the devil, in order to overthrow the house of Habsburg; that he would accept aid from anywhere—never mind whether Louis Napoleon or the czar were held to represent the devil. Kossuth's former principles were thus thrown overboard. His connection with the court of the Tuileries soon afterwards became a public fact. His connection with Mazzini and Ledru-Rollin ceased.

These circumstances must be taken into account when judging of the nature of his proposal for the establishment of a Danubian confederacy, by which he sought to traverse the policy of Deak. The aims of Deak may have been modest enough. His ideas of parliamentary autonomy under the old ruling house may not have exercised much charm upon the mind of men that remembered the heroic deeds of the Revolution. But at any rate, Deak's procedure preserved the existence of the Hungarian nation; whereas Kossuth's scheme actually threatened to swamp it.

"I cannot sign Kossuth's programme, even though I might personally have no objection to the idea of a Danubian confederacy," said to me, at the time, one of the foremost army leaders of the Hungarian revolution; "I cannot sign it, because at home I should be looked upon as a traitor!"

Kossuth's plan, in fact, was this. Hungary, with her annexes—comprising, as she does even now, so many discordant tribes that the Magyar nationality is much hemmed in by them—was to be enlarged into a "Danubian Confederacy" by the addition of Roumania, Servia, and—a