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266 a view of taking the Germans in flank during their enterprise. Brunswick, however, was a master in the art of spying, a part of warfare then conducted with thoroughness: so taking his measures for getting early and complete information from the spot, he was presently reassured by the fact that nothing was yet done up to the time that his little army was all ready for its business. The foreign policy of France, in those last years of the unfortunate Louis XVI., was in one of the fits of indecision and nervousness which alternate strangely in the nation's history with acts of passionate and dangerous temerity. There was a great desire universally felt to avenge Rosbach and humble Prussia. But no doubt the pecuniary difficulties which brought on the great revolutionary crisis two years later were already pressing heavily on the ministry of Louis. At any rate the opportunity, such as it was, was suffered to slip away; and "the sharp German axe that (according to a national boast) can cut the tightest knot," had fully done its work before the unready court of Versailles had resolved on any action. Still there was present throughout on the other side the fear that the talked-of French preparations might be begun; and both the diplomatic action and military preparations of Prussia were hurried forward in consequence, so that all attempts at a pacific solution had been openly abandoned by September 12th, and the army received its orders that day to be ready to cross the frontier on the following morning.

Of the forces disposable for Brunswick's operations the strength, and its distribution in three divisions of about eight thousand men each, have been already mentioned; and as usual with Prussian writers, Baron Troschke goes, at this portion of his task, into elaborate detail.

It is sufficient for us here to say in the first place, that the boasted invention of horse-artillery by Frederick did not help his successor here, the maintenance of that arm having been abandoned by the great captain from motives of economy in his later years. Four field-batteries, therefore, and these hardly capable of more rapid motion than a walking pace, represented the artillery arm, as the word is now understood, in the duke's force. But his infantry battalions, according to the custom of the day, were each accompanied by their own light field-guns.

The cavalry, on the other hand, viewed also as at present known in Prussia, were thus early represented in each branch except that of the famous uhlan or lancer. Brunswick had with him two regiments of cuirassiers (a branch that had then just laid aside the cumbrous armour it took its name from); one of dragoons, still (by what was fast becoming the fiction it now has long been) supposed to be specially capable of doing dismounted service; and portions of two regiments of hussars for his light duties, one being that which had been so gloriously distinguished under Zieten in Frederick's early days, and still bore the name of the greatest sabreur of modern war.

Of engineers, a single detachment, known as a "troop," was assigned to the army, and this probably in consideration of the coming siege-work. For the days had not yet come when the great organizer Scharnhorst was to make of this new branch a component element of every Prussian field-force.

Of the infantry, which of course formed the bulk of the twenty-six thousand fighting men, one part must be particularly noticed. Out of eight regiments detailed for the campaign, one only, and that of small strength, was formed of fusiliers — in other words, of infantry soldiers dressed in green, carrying rather lighter arms than the rest, and specially taught to skirmish. The tradition then was, and it remained long after France, Austria, and Russia successively abandoned it, indeed until the Prussian army went down helpless under its weight at Jena, that the infantrymen must as a rule fight solely in the steady shoulder-to-shoulder line which Frederick had so often led to victory. So to a proportion of some sixteen thousand of these closely-drilled soldiers, it was thought quite sufficient, according to the routine of those days, to allot two moderate battalions of light infantry, intended to cover the front and flank from annoyance; to which were, however, added two companies of riflemen recruited originally from the royal foresters, and probably the most efficient troops of their class in the world. In such figures, and a close adherence to the dead system they represent, may be readily found the key to the utter defeat of Prussian pride not many years after by the Frenchmen trained to more agile warfare in the revolutionary campaigns. But English soldiers of all men should be the last to criticise the error. The sounds of the centenary anniversaries of Lexington and Bunker's Hill still ring across the Atlantic. And Lexington and Bunker's Hill celebrations only really