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Rh  of Great Britain, a powerful islandstate, isolated by circumstances, and surrounded by potential foes. That the German chiefs feel this dread in some fashion is evident from the recent military laws which place the whole population at their disposal, from the large concessions they would make to Denmark if she would enter the federation, from the anxious desire to remain more than friends with Russia, and from the frequent repetition of the threat that were the danger to increase, Germany would not wait to be attacked. The immediate danger is always represented as arising from the side of France, because Germans are more easily moved from that side, and because the war of 1870 makes such a statement reasonable, and consequently Englishmen always expect that any blow or menace of a blow from Berlin will be directed ﬁrst against Versailles. But they may be mistaken in that opinion. The German chancellor, when reasoning on concrete facts, is the ablest, as well as the most daring, statesman in Europe, and he may hold a very different view of the situation; It is not France he dreads, but a coalition. He can ﬁght France easily enough, if France has no ally. It is not victory he desires, but additional and permanent strength for Germany. To follow his thought, one must not watch telegrams or semi-inspired leaders, but look around, and see whether any great addition of strength is to be obtained for Germany; and if so, where. Clearly it is not to be obtained in France. Supposing the German government suddenly to insist that French armaments should stop, to demand Champagne as a material guarantee, and by a supreme exertion of strength to march once more on Paris, what would it permanently gain? Nothing, except a larger disaffected territory to garrison, an a larger population to be kept down by force. Russia would not be weaker because France was occupied, but stronger; the Hapsburgs would not be less hostile because Germany had her Poland, but more hopeful; Germany would not be more ﬁtted for battle, but more distracted by new and most exhausting labour. Of course the extinction of France would end one of the German difficulties, but how is France to be extinguished without permanent military repression?

Nor is the advantage sought to be obtained in Russia. That Germany might beat Russia is conceivable, in spite of the recent improvements in the mobility of the Russian army, and the acquiescence of the people in the new conscription, and she might then reclaim the Baltic provinces; but the quick defeat of Russia is, from the tenacity of the national character and the vast depth of the czar’s dominions, nearly impossible, and a long campaign to the eastward would bring France into the ﬁeld. It would, in fact, give the word for the very coalition we are assuming Germany to dread. The difficulty, too, of inducing the Hohenzollern family to attack relatives who have so often helped it, and who have shared with it the spoils of Poland, might prove to be insuperable: while the Baltic provinces, undefended and indefensible as they are to the east, might prove a most dangerous possession. While, therefore, we hold a spring on France unlikely unless provoked by Versailles, we deem one upon Moscow nearly beyond that list of possibilities which statesmen are warranted in taking into consideration. But is the third member of the coalition equally secure? It seems to us that if the German government really saw occasion to put everything once more to hazard — an occasion which we do not assume, and can hardly believe in — its temptation would lie southward, to spring rapidly and decisively on Vienna, and gain ten million more German subjects, before presidents or czars could seriously interfere. The risk involved in such an effort would be dreadful, for it could only be successful if victory were as immediate, crushing, and ﬁnal as it was in the Seven Days' War; but then victor would not only not be barren, but would secure most of the results for which it is assumed that Germany longs, — security against coalitions and outlet to the southern world. No power could touch Germany if the Hapsburgs were once driven to Buda-Pesth, and no power save France would hold such inﬂuence in the Mediterranean. From Hamburg to Trieste all would be German. Of course if Austria were a burden such as northern France would be, Germany would gain nothing; but what chance would there be that Austria would be a burden, that the change once accomplished, the southern Germans would be disaffected to the empire to which for so many centuries they belonged? It must be a very small one. No man alive, certainly no outsider, can quite say what is the strength of the bond between the Hapsburgs and their people; but no one either will