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 But then it goes far beyond what is admittedly certain and verifiable, which is what we mean by scientific. It attempts far too much. If we want here, as we do want, to have what is admittedly certain and verifiable, we must content ourselves with very little. No one will say, that it is admittedly certain and verifiable, that there is a personal first cause, the moral and intelligent governor of the universe, whom we may call God if we will. But that all things seem to us to have what we call a law of their being, and to tend to fulfil it, is certain and admitted; though whether we will call this God or not, is a matter of choice. Suppose, however, we call it God, we then give the name of God to a certain admitted reality; this, at least, is an advantage.

And the notion of our definition does, in fact, enter into the term God, in men's common use of it. To please God, to serve God, to obey God's will, means to follow a law of things which is found in conscience, and which is an indication, irrespective of our arbitrary wish and fancy, of what we ought to do. There is, then, a real power which makes for righteousness; and it is the greatest of realities for us. When St. Paul says, that our business is 'to serve the spirit of God,' 'to serve the living and true God;' and when Epictetus says: 'What do I want?—to acquaint myself with the natural order of things, and comply with it,' they both mean, so far, the same, in that they both mean we should obey a tendency, which is not ourselves, but which