Page:Lindsley v. TRT Holdings (20-10263) (2021) Opinion.pdf/5

 documents on her computer were deleted, which the IT department said were not recoverable. She says that she was not able to fulfill her job duties without the deleted documents. Lindsley alleges that her successor, by contrast, was able to access those documents. Lindsley took FMLA leave again in May 2016 and then left Omni in June 2016. She filed this suit in October 2017.

Lindsley brings three types of claims: (1) pay discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Texas Labor Code, and the Equal Pay Act; (2) promotional discrimination under Title VII and the Texas Labor Code; and (3) retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC and for taking FMLA leave under the FMLA, Title VII, the Texas Labor Code, and the Equal Pay Act. Omni moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court granted its motion in full. Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 6467256 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2019). Lindsley timely appealed, contending that the district court erred in granting Omni’s motion for summary judgment on all claims.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. ''Hagen v. Aetna Ins. Co.'', 808 F.3d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” even after giving Lindsley the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record, and Omni is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 56(a). See, e.g., ''Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'', 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Lindsley. See Harville v. City of Houston, 945 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019).