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, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1880), and on its discussion of the English case of Cobbett v. Woodward, Law Rep. 14 Eq. 407. The gist of Cobbett v. Woodward is that a furniture catalogue is not copyrightable because it constitutes advertising. Counsel for appellees conceded on oral argument that advertising is copyrightable, as indeed he must in the face of overwhelming authority. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460 (1903); L. A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 39 S.Ct. 194, 63 L.Ed. 499 (1919); Campbell v. Wireback, 269 F. 872 (4th Cir. 1920); Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932); Weir v. Gordon, 216 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1954).

On the issue of originality the trial court seems to have been led astray by the dual meaning of the word. The court cited as an example a drawing of a Texaco oil can and concluded that, “There was nothing original in the drawing or sketch. Any meticulous artist, looking at the can before him, would have drawn it in the same manner, achieving the same result.” However, this reasoning would be even more applicable to photographs, which are commonly held to be copyrightable. Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distributing Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir. 1922); Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 88 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1937). “Originality” in copyright law is not a question of creativity or novelty, but one of authorship or source of origin. “ ‘Original’ in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to the ‘author.’ No large measure of novelty is necessary.” Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). To paraphrase the language of the Supreme Court in the Bleistein case, appellees were free to copy the original oil can, but they were not free to copy Baxter’s copy of the can.

The third ground of the trial court’s decision was that of insufficient notice of the copyright. This ground is also twofold. First, inasmuch as much of the material in the catalogues was admittedly not copyrightable, the notice of the copyright printed on the cover of the catalogues was insufficient to give notice to the public as to which of the myriad items in the catalogues were copyrighted. Secondly, the language used in the certificates of copyright was so indefinite and uncertain as to be a failure of notice to the public.

The first basis of the court’s conclusion as to notice is contrary to the express language of the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 3, and to the holdings of the decided cases. Markham v. A. E. Borden Co., Inc., 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953); Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Giuliani Statuary Co., 189 F. 90 (C.C.D.Minn.1911); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Kaufman, 189 F. 215 (C.C.M.D.Pa.1911); P.I.C. Design Corporation v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F.Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y.1964).

The second ground was that the language of the copyright certificates was too indefinite and uncertain. The certificates stated, “New matter consists of new artistic drawings of merchandise, new textual and pictorial material not previously published and new layouts and revisions.” Given the language of 17 U.S.C. § 3, quoted in, we find that the certificates give all notice the statute requires and the conclusion that the language of the certificates is too indefinite and uncertain is erroneous.

In fairness to the learned trial judge, it should be pointed out that the great majority of the authorities relied upon in this opinion were cited neither to the trial court nor to this court.

The court did not mention in its memorandum decision anything relative to a finding that appellees copied from