Page:Life of William Shelburne (vol 1).djvu/389

Rh Whether the independence of Corsica from French control was an object worth contending for by arms may be doubted. The representatives of Chatham in the Ministry felt, however, that the friendship of France was only waiting for a convenient opportunity to be converted into overt hostility, and that any display of weakness on the part of England was likely to hasten the moment. It was desirable, therefore, to act with diplomatic vigour in a case in which not only were the sympathies of the nation strongly aroused, and the maritime interests of the country affected in a greater or less degree, but the course adopted by France was also a clear violation of existing treaties, and in direct contradiction with her own conduct in protesting against the occupation of the Falkland Islands by England as a violation of the status in quo. Again the moment was singularly favourable for the adoption by England of diplomatic action. The councils of the French ministry were as divided on the subject of Corsica as those of the English ministry on America, for the idea of occupying the island at this juncture was peculiarly Choiseul's own, and was therefore unpopular with his numerous enemies at court. Nor was their case weak, for Choiseul had traded on the party divisions in England to carry out his plan unmolested, and although the navy of France had been allowed to get out of repair with a view to economy, the finances of the country had not had time to recover sufficiently to bear the expense of hostilities.

The Genoese had for some time past been receiving assistance from France under a Convention made in 1764: the French undertaking to garrison several of the most important military positions in the island on behalf of the Genoese, who in return released a heavy debt owing to them by their allies. Before the end of