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14 assist Him two ways: it would serve to keep the army employed, and furnish matter for the attention of the Parisians, who would thus be withdrawn from too close a consideration of his own newly-acquired power; and it would also compel us to be continually on the alert, gradually exhaust our resources, and pave the way for a general pacification.

The leading features of the policy of Bonaparte towards England, at this crisis, appear to have been, to excite a confederacy against us among the maritime powers, and to exclude us from all the ports of Europe; then to attack Portugal, our only remaining ally, and if possible subdue her; and finally, by the continued threat of invasion, exhaust our patience and impoverish our finances.

The progress of the Northern Confederacy became every day more marked ; Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, entered into it with avidity. Denmark had long been a pacific nation, never having been engaged in war for upwards of eighty years; it might, therefore, have been presumed that she would reluctantly enter the lists; yet it is remarkable that that power was the first, the last, and the only government, that was engaged in actual hostilities.

Thus situated, early in March a powerful fleet was sent to the Baltic, under the command of Sir Hyde Parker and Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, with a view of attacking the northern powers ere they could effect their meditated junction with the fleets of France and Holland. The English passed the Sound on the 13th of March, and reconnoitred the Road of Copenhagen, where the Crown-Prince, Regent of Denmark, had made formidable preparations to receive them. It was on the 2nd of April, that Nelson, who had volunteered to lead the assault, having at length obtained a favourable wind, advanced with twelve ships of the line, besides frigates and fire-ships, upon the Danish armament, which consisted of six