Page:Life of Henry Clay (Schurz; v. 2).djvu/271

Rh opinion, by the operation of the inevitable laws of population. It would be unwise to refuse a permanent acquisition, which will exist as long as the globe remains, on account of a temporary institution.”

Whether these letters were extorted from him by the cry of the extreme annexationists, “Texas or disunion!” or whether they were merely a bid for Southern votes, in either case Clay could not, as to their effect upon the election, have committed a greater blunder. They could not strengthen him where he was weak: they could only weaken him where he was strong. They could not induce the annexationists to trust him: they could only make the opponents of annexation doubtful as to whether he deserved to be trusted by them. They could only repel the anti-slavery vote, for they declared that the anti-slavery argument against the annexation of Texas was without value.

The Liberty party suddenly rose to a practical importance in the canvass which it had not enjoyed before. Some of its speakers and writers had, indeed, attacked Clay, from the beginning of the campaign, as a “slave-holder and a gambler.” True, Polk was a slave-holder, too; Polk and his party were pledged to do what the anti-slavery men held most in abhorrence, — enlarge the area of slavery. The Whig party contained a much larger element congenial to the anti-slavery men than did the Democracy, and the election of Clay