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 rational intelligence; on the other side was the directing principle of life, the irrational and vegetative Psyche.

This distinction agrees with the fact of the diffusion of life. Life does not belong to the superior animals alone, and to the man in whom we can recognize a reasoning soul. It is extended to the vast multitude of humbler beings to which such lofty faculties cannot be attributed, the invertebrates, microscopic animals, and plants. The advantage is compensated for by the inconvenience of breaking down all continuity between the soul and life; a continuity which is the principle of the two other doctrines, animism and monism, and which is, we may say, the very aim and the unquestionable tendency of science.

As for classical philosophy, it satisfies the necessity of establishing the unity of the living being,—i.e., of bringing into harmony soul and body,—but in a manner which we need not here discuss. It attributes to the soul several modalities, several distinct powers: powers of the vegetative life, powers of the sensitive life, and powers of the intellectual life. And this other solution of the problem would be, in the opinion of M. Gardair, in complete agreement with the doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Vitalism reached its most perfect expression in the second half of the eighteenth century in the hands of the representatives of the Montpellier school—Bordeu, Grimaud, and Barthez. The last, in particular, contributed to the prevalence of the doctrine in