Page:Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston of Texas (1884).djvu/586

 moiety of the present Judiciary Committee, in whose elaborate and conclusive report the following finding of the facts is included: "That while holding the office of District Judge of the United States, he engaged with other persons in speculating in immense tracts of land situated within his judicial district, the titles to which he knew were in dispute, and where litigation was inevitable.

"That he allowed his court to be used as an agent, to aid himself and partners in speculation in land, and to secure an advantage over other persons with whom litigation was apprehended. That he sat as judge on the trial of cases where he was personally interested in questions involved, to which may be added a participation in the improper procurement of testimony to advance his own and partner's interests."

Into the merits of the legal question, with respect to the appeal sought to be taken by Mussina in the Cavazos case, I do not propose to inquire. It is indispensable, however, to insure a clear understanding of the case, and to complete its history, to notice the matter, and to read here the judgment pronounced on this branch of the Watrous case by the following honorable gentlemen, composing a moiety of the House Judiciary Committee before alluded to: Messrs. Henry Chapman, of Pennsylvania; Charles Billinghurst, of Wisconsin; Miles Taylor, of Louisiana, and George S. Houston, of Alabama: "And, finally, they are prevented from having the decision against them reviewed in the appellate court, by the failure of the judge to perform his full duty to them in facilitating the exercise of the right of appeal, given to them by law, from motives of public policy, for their own private advantage."

It appears that Mussina applied to the Supreme Court for a rule for a mandamus against Judge Watrous, who had, as he conceived, refused or defeated his application for an appeal, which was within the time prescribed by the law. To this Judge Watrous answered, and sustained his answer by the testimony of Cleveland, Parker, Jones, Love, and son. It is revealed in the testimony that William G. Hale was here in Washington, on the spot. Mr. Love, the clerk of Judge Watrous, says: "Mr. Hale sent from Washington city a copy of Mr. Mussina's affidavit before the Supreme Court of the United States." " I got four or five affidavits, and enclosed them to Judge Watrous. All of us [i.e., Clevelnnd, Parker, Jones, his son, and himself, all creatures of the court] agreed in making the affidavits on our own recollection."

It is unnecessary to review the testimony of these witnesses before the House committee. A mere inspection of it will present the contradictions with which it abounds, and will show the changes and shifting of the witnesses, according as their recollections are refreshed from time to time by Judge Watrous. It would appear that on this testimony and the statement of Judge Watrous, the rule for a mandamus was denied. In a further part of the testimony taken in the Judge Watrous investigation, it is shown that the Supreme Court would not permit the truth of a judge's return, in a case of this nature, to be questioned; "that by the practice of the Supreme Court, it did not allow a question of fact to be raised on the return of any