Page:Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston of Texas (1884).djvu/570

 —Endorsed: "We, the jury, find a verdict for the plaintiffs for the ten leagues of land described in the plaintiff's petition, and also ten cents damages.

"March 1o, 1854., Foreman."

This appears to have gone by default. Now, to obtain a default, a chain of title was necessary; such a chain was to be exhibited Yet it is found to be admitted by counsel, more than a year after this trial, that the authority to sell the land in suit—the power of attorney to Williams—the main link of the title, was wanting. It could not have been before the court or the jury, when the verdict was entered. It could not, for the especial reason that the default was entered in March, 1854, and the testimony of the parties in the Watrous investigation shows that the power was never transcribed, or withdrawn from the land office, until December of that year. Juries, it is to be recollected, are selected in Judge Watrous' court—not balloted for. Further comment than this is unnecessary.

This default was opened at the suggestion of Judge Watrous, as the judgment by default did not appear to answer the purpose he had in view. The object evidently was to have the title completed, by introducing the power of attorney, and obtaining judgment of its genuineness. And the fact most striking is that at the second trial, Robert Hughes, the representative of Judge Watrous, is smuggled into the case for the defense, and very kindly furnished to the opposite counsel, William G. Hale, Esq., the power referred to—the very link of title necessary to defeat him, Robert Hughes, in the defense of the suit!

I have adverted to a scene in the Ufford and Dykes case. I wish the attention of Senators to another scene, transpiring after the lapse of about one year, in the same cause, and in the same court. Judge Watrous is on the bench. Before him stand Robert Hughes and William G. Hale. Contemplate for a moment the position of these parties. Judge Watrous is the owner of an interest valued at seventy-five thousand dollars in the La Vega grant, which, it appears, he purchased in reliance on the opinion of Robert Hughes. To Hughes is intrusted the defense of his title. He is the "sole counsel" for Lapsley and others. He stands now before the court in opposition to that title, as "the leading counsel for the defendant, and controlled its management." Here is Robert Hughes, the representative of Judge Watrous, interested in the La Vega title, standing before Judge Watrous, in opposition to that title. What a strange and anomalous position, surely! Here is his honor, John C. Watrous, on the bench; and here, John C. Watrous personated by Hughes at the bar. The case is called, and the curtain rises on still further developments in the scene. The plaintiff's counsel, William G. Hale, announces himself ready to proceed, except that he lacks the power of attorney to Williams, that is all-important to complete his title. Judge Watrous, through his representative, or Hughes, as representing the Judge, supplies that want; thus kindly giving to his opponent. Hale, the very means of defeating him (Hughes) in the suit; but mark you, the means also of sustaining the title of Judge Watrous—for the power of attorney was common to both titles. I have already shown, in the Cavazos case, how counsel of this vast company were introduced for purposes of