Page:Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.pdf/16

Beech-Jones J

charged with an indictable offence that is not disposed of summarily."

Save for where the Children's Court committed a person for trial or sentence to a higher court in respect of an indictable offence (including a serious indictable offence), proceedings in the Children's Court were required to be dealt with summarily. With the possible exception of three offences, all of the offences for which the plaintiff was sentenced by the Children's Court when he was under the age of 16 years were not serious indictable offences and the plaintiff was not committed to a higher court. Leaving aside those three offences (which may have been misdescribed in the police certificate), it should therefore be concluded that the plaintiff could not have been, and was not, "convicted" of any of those offences. Instead, he either pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of those offences.

Section 15(1) of the Children Proceedings Act imposed a (limited) restriction on the use that might be made of a finding of guilt of (or a plea of guilty to) an offence committed by a person when they were a child. It provided that a finding of guilt shall not be admitted in evidence in any criminal proceedings that might be subsequently taken against that person, other than in the Children's Court, provided that no conviction was recorded following that finding of guilt (or plea) and the person has not been punished by a court for any offence committed in the two years prior to the commencement of those subsequent proceedings.

Section 33(1) of the Children Proceedings Act conferred power on the Children's Court to make orders that amount to the imposition of a sentence. This included the power to make an order committing a person to the control of the relevant Minister for a period of time that does not exceed two years, ie, a "control order". The existence of the power to make orders under s 33(1) was predicated