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 John Lennon by means of assignment or license. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(B)(ii). Because the record contains no evidence as to the circumstances under which Northern Songs, Limited obtained the copyright, defendants assert that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing a clear likelihood of success on their claim of copyright infringement.

This Court disagrees. A renewal registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(4)(B). Certainly, the presumption of validity is rebuttable. See ''Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI'', 193 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir.1999). The party challenging the validity of the copyright, however, bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. Id. Here, defendants raise doubts concerning the validity of the renewal copyright by arguing that plaintiffs have failed to explain gaps in the chain of ownership. Without any evidence of invalidity whatsoever, however, defendants cannot rebut the statutory presumption. Accordingly, plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of copyright infringement.

2. Defendants’ Fair Use Defense

The doctrine of fair use, as codified by the Copyright Act of 1976, is as follows: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work. . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching. . ., scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. “From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. . . .’” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The fair use doctrine “‘permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” Id. at 577, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (brackets omitted)).

In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered include: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. The four statutory factors, which are nonexclusive, must be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Moreover, “the determination of fair use is an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry.” Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir.2006). “The ultimate test of fair use. . . is whether the copyright law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts. . . would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court now turns to each of the four statutory fair use factors.

The first statutory factor is “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). This factor, “the heart of the fair use inquiry,” comprises principally two considerations: whether the use is “commercial” and whether it is “transformative.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).