Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/67

 �This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 to continue to perform for the Department of the Air Force common services in such fields as finance, hospital famhties, quarter- master admimstraton, and transporta- tion. 9 Although the Directorate of the Bud- get of the Ar Force was completely reor- ganized in fiscal year 1948 in order to segregat the funds for the operation of the Air Force from those of the Army, and have separate appropriations, complete segregation of funds was not achieved until fiscal year 1950. ø Despite the Army-Air Force agreements the unification of the three services pro- ceeded slowly. The loosely coordinated sys- tem which Forfestal advocated failed, m practice, to unify. This was partly because of the lack of real authority given to the Secretary of Defense under the NationaI curfry Act, partly because of differences in interservice positions. In 1948 the Air Force had already begun to manifest xts dissatis- faction wth the restricted budget, /eelhug that the Navy was being provided wxth a disproportionately large share of the avail- able funds and that the plant, weapons, and ships of the Navy were already far out of line with the existing material strength of the Air Force. - One of the most difficult problems relat- ing to the unification of the armed forces was the question of the specific roles and missions of the different branches of the service; and the emergence of the atomic bomb as the real core of American military srength had the unfortunate effect of in- creasing differences of opinion between the Executive Order 9877, 26 $uly 1947, in which President Truman outlined the rune- %ions of the armed serwces was couched m such general terms that the hree services were able to interpret i differently. Spurred on by the critical reports of the Congres- sional Aviation Policy ]3oard and the Presi- dent's Air Policy Commission, Secretary of Defense Forfestal held two series of con- ferences with the chiefs of the armed forces. At the first series of conferences held at Key West, Florida, 11-14 March 1948, and con- cluded by a final session at Washington one week later, the principle of primary and collateral activities was adopted, each serv- ice being assigned its prnnary functions. A pimary function of the Air Force was o be the conduct of strategic ar warfare. in the field of collateral activities the Air Force was allowed to paxhcipate in antisubmarrae warfare and the protection oœ shipping. On the other hand, among the Navy's primary functions were antsubmarme waftare, the proectmn of shipping, and mine-laying. In the field of coilstotal activities the Navy could conduct close support for land oper- ations [although this was primarily an Air Force function]. The Navy was not to de- velop a separate straegm air iorce, this function being reserved to the USAF; but it could launch mr attacks on inland tar- gets in the carrying out of its primary func- tions. The Air Force recognized the right of the Navy to carry on the developmen of weapons it considered necessary to its iunc- ticns, and recognized the right and need for the Na/ to participate in an all-out air campa/gn. The Army was also assigned ts primary and collateral functions2  Because the decisions made at Key West did not settle all the problelng involved in defining the spemfic roles and rmssions of each of the services, and their respective functions in the field of strategic planning, particularly insofar as the Navy and Air ForC were concerned, a second series of meetings was held, 20-22 August 1948, a the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, where several xmportant decisions were made.* It was agreed, as an interim measure, that the Chief of the Armed Serv- ices Special Weapons Pro]oct, which han- dled the atomic bomb, would report to the Chmf of Staff, USAF--a decsion which gave the Air Force Operational control of the atomic bomb for the time being. Another important decision clarified the term "primary mission." In the fields of its primary missions (such as strategic bomb- ing by the Air Force) each service was to have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming, but in the execution of that mission all avmlable resources (in- 1Feet Agreement" o 1 October 1953 or the texf. of this revision rfer to Departmenf O the Air :Pcrce, Air larce 1111etrt NO 9, FltetJOTt of the Arned Forces acl ihe ,Yoint Chiaf ef taff, %Vashiugon, 9 July 1954. THIS PAGE Declassified lAW EO12958
 * The Seerclaimer of Defense issued a revision Of the "Iey