Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/51

 �This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 The reorganization of the Army air arm had its effect on the attitude of Congress. After the 20 June 1941 reorganization, dis- cussed in the precechng chapter, there was a sharp decrease m the number of bills concerning an independent or a coordinate air arm. From that date until the 9 March 1942 reorgamzation, only two relevant bills were introduced and these died in commit- tee. During the last nine months of 1942 and through the next two years there was relatively httle congressional comment on the organization of the natmn's armed forces. Yet during that period at least 20 different measures, each tookrag toward the creation of a separate ar Iorce or a 3-way department of national defense, were intro- duced In Congress. Some of these bills were "repeat performances," and all of them died in committee, without benefit of hear- ing. 4q Congress, in refusing to bring such meas- ures out of committee for consderahon, was probably motivated by a desire to concen- trate on getting on with the war; also t probably felt that it was better to defer the cormideration of such legislation until after the war, so that there would be no danger of disrupting the war effort by the turmoil incident to controversy over reorganiza- tion, and the confusion arising from reor- ganization itself if it received statutory sanction. Too, the very large degree of autonomy granted the AAF in actual prac- tice had a mollifying effect on the ar force enthusiasts in Congress. No doubt Congress was also influenced by the attitude of the War Department and the Air Staff who felt that it would be dangerous to make any change in the status of the air force at this tnne. In the meantime the mlhtary estabhsh- merit itself was studying the question of further reorganization of our national de- fense agencies. In a study dated 1i October 1943 the Special Planning Dvision of the General Staff stressed the need for a single department of national defense to coordi- nate the various agencies of the nation's armed forces, asserting that the absence of real unity of command had hampered the prosecution of the war. The repo of this group stated that both economy and na- trenal security demanded that the armed services be coorchnated under a unified com- mand. A plan was recommended whereby a "Department of the Armed Forces" would be set up under a Secretary directly re- sponsible to the President. There would then be three under secretaries, one each for Army, Navy, and Air. Each of these three major branches would have a chief of staff, In conjunction with a director of common suppIies and a chief oœ staff to the President, they would make up a council known as the Chiefs of Staff. Congress also began to consider the ques- tion of postwar planning, and on 28 March 1944 the House of Representatives act up the Select Committee on Post-War Policy (also called the Woodrum Committee after its chairman, Clifton A. Woodrum of Vir- ginia). Made up of seven members from the House Committee on Military Affairs, seven from the House Committee on NavaI Affairs, and nine members who belonged to neither, this committee was an investigat. ing, not a legislative, orgamzation. The key testimony before this committee was thaO offered by Br/g. Gem H. S. Hansell, Jr., Deputy Chief of Air Staff. General Hansell in presenting the wows of the AAF, stressed the need for a uncaion of land, sea, and air forces under one head for the purpose of flexibility and coordination in operation, and economy and simplicity in administra- tmn. He felt that the experience gained so far m World War Ii had demonstrated beyond all question the need for unity of command. He stated hat there was no place in modern war for a separate army, a sepa- rate navy, or a separate air force--all of a nation's fighting forces must be integrated into a single urnfled organizatonA s The testimony of Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett was along similar lines. Pointing out the inefficiency and wastefulness of the cumbersome system of committees by which Army-Navy coop. erstion was secured, he said he was con- vinced that future wars were likely to be, as was World War II, "a series of combined operatrans in which Ground, Sea, and Air THIS PAGE Declassflied lAW EO12958